North Korean Actors Exploit Weak DMARC Security Policies to Mask Spearphishing Efforts
Summary
Authors: FBI, U.S. Department of State, NSA.
Focus: North Korean Kimsuky cyber actors exploit improperly configured DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance) policies to conduct spearphishing campaigns.
Objective: Highlighting the techniques used by these actors to mask their social engineering attempts and offering mitigation measures.
Background
North Korean Cyber Program: Managed by the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which is responsible for intelligence collection and cyber espionage.
Kimsuky Group: Known aliases include Emerald Sleet, APT43, Velvet Chollima, and Black Banshee. Their mission is to gather geopolitical intelligence through compromised data and use it to enhance spearphishing campaigns.
Kimsuky’s Operations: DMARC Policy Not Enabled
DMARC Protocol: Helps authenticate emails sent from an organization’s domain. If not properly configured, it allows cyber actors to send spoofed emails that appear legitimate.
Technique: Kimsuky actors leverage social engineering by creating convincing email messages and personas, often impersonating journalists, academics, or experts.
Red Flag Indicators
Common Indicators:
- Initial communications are innocuous, followed by malicious links/documents.
- Content may include text from previous victim communications.
- Emails have awkward grammar and sentence structure.
- Targeted at individuals with knowledge of policy information.
- Spoofed email addresses with slight misspellings.
- Malicious documents require enabling macros.
- Follow-up emails within a few days if no response.
Sample Emails and Headers
Examples:
Sample Email 1: Invitation to speak at a conference, offering a speaker fee.
Sample Email 2: Request for an interview on North Korean issues, with a diversion to a fake personal account for responses.
Headers: Illustrate how technical analysis can identify spoofing and failed DMARC checks.
Mitigation Measures
Recommendations:
- DMARC Policy:
- Set to “quarantine” (v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;).
- Set to “reject” (v=DMARC1; p=reject;).
- Reporting: Use “rua” to receive aggregate reports on DMARC results.
Tables and Graphics
Table: Summary of Key Points
Section | Key Points |
---|---|
Summary | FBI, State, NSA highlight DMARC exploitation by Kimsuky cyber actors. |
Background | North Korean RGB oversees cyber operations. Kimsuky group targets geopolitical intelligence. |
DMARC Policy Not Enabled | Improper DMARC configurations allow spoofed emails. |
Red Flag Indicators | Indicators of spearphishing include awkward grammar, targeted policy experts, and follow-up emails. |
Sample Emails and Headers | Examples of spearphishing emails and how to identify spoofed email headers. |
Mitigation Measures | Recommended DMARC policies: quarantine or reject. Use "rua" for aggregate reports. |
Graphic: DMARC Policy Configuration
DMARC Policy
- "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;"
- Quarantines emails failing DMARC check
- "v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
- Rejects emails failing DMARC check
- "rua"
- Aggregate reports for DMARC results
Graphic: Red Flag Indicators
Red Flag Indicators
- Innocuous initial communication
- Awkward grammar and sentence structure
- Emails targeting policy experts
- Spoofed email addresses with slight errors
- Malicious documents requiring macros
- Follow-up emails within a few days